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In this context, messages evolve from 
discussions and focus on practical, de-
tailed and precise alternatives as a way of pro-
moting a reduction in risk-taking behavior. A 
key tool in this regard is village-risk mapping, 
which can also be fed into the mine-marking 
and prioritization process. In addition, as not-
ed in the 2001 Landmine Monitor Report, “as a 
result of its community focus, mine awareness/
community-liaison is also well placed to iden-
tify mine survivors who have unmet needs. Al-
though community-liaison teams should not 
necessarily be expected to have technical ex-
pertise in mine-survivor assistance, some-
times amputees are not aware of the existence 
of prosthetics clinics, or believe that being fit-
ted with a replacement or even a first artificial 
limb will be prohibitively expensive. In such a 
case, the simple transfer of information—and 
possibly the provision of transport—can suf-
fice to make a world of difference to an individ-
ual and his/her family.”6
Similarly, a broader community-liaison 
approach can include rapid-response “spot” 
explosive-ordnance-disposal activities. In 
Cambodia, the focus of MRE is now on risk 
reduction in the widest sense. The country 
modified its traditional information-based ap-
proach in favor of one focusing more on under-
taking concrete steps to make a particular area 
safe. This process is accomplished through im-
proved marking and removal of known and 
dangerous ordnance. The approach is aided by 
the fact that a team may spend many days in a 
village undertaking unexploded ordnance re-
moval, proximity clearance, awareness presen-
tations, discussions and mapping. 
In order to better protect children from 
landmines and UXO, “child-to-child” train-
ing entered the MRE lexicon in 1999, with a 
number of organizations incorporating “child-
to-child” methodology into awareness pro-
grams, most notably in Kosovo. In a context 
where teaching is typically authoritarian and 
learning is rote, child-to-child techniques can 
be liberating and empowering both for the 
children and their teachers. Some anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this approach also re-
sults in information sharing in the home and, 
as such, it can be used to educate parents via 
their children.7
Similar to demining, MRE should also 
demonstrate a clear and concise approach to 
prioritizing its activities. It is one thing to tar-
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get thousands of people assumed to be “at some 
risk” through a well-designed community-
based project or provide basic radio messages 
to millions, but it is quite another to make sure 
that all those who are truly the most at-risk are 
targeted, first with the appropriate messages 
and second, in a timely and systematic man-
ner. Ongoing national surveillance systems 
on mine/ERW incidents, combined with sur-
vey tools on knowledge and practices, provide 
key data that can help identify the most at-risk 
groups of people in the most at-risk communi-
ties, adjust prevention messages and find the 
best channels to reach them. 
Continued Necessity
MRE continues to evolve in tandem with 
the changing nature of the mine/ERW threat 
and communities’ needs to practice effective 
risk reduction. As such, MRE is no more about 
simple awareness-raising than demining is 
about just digging up landmines. MRE contin-
ues to be an integral part of our efforts and re-
sponsibility to meet the needs of those living in 
mine-/ERW-affected environments and to help 
fulfill their universal right to life. 
See Endnotes, Page 112
The people of Afghanistan have seen more than their share of war and conflict. Explosive remnants of war and their consequenc-es have been a part of Afghans’ lives since the 1980s. Mine-risk 
education has therefore been important in communicating the dangers 
of ERW. Children have always been among the most vulnerable to these 
dangers, and MRE campaigns are therefore usually aimed at them.1
In the current conflict between the NATO-led International Secu-
rity Assistance Force and insurgents, civilians are again living with the 
consequences of war. With the rise of insurgent activity, IEDs have be-
come increasingly common. IED casualties have risen tremendously 
and now surpass the ERW casualties. This development fostered dis-
cussions about whether the mine-action community should create risk-
education materials about IEDs, culminating in the development of an 
IED-awareness booklet in 2008.
Mine-risk Education in Afghanistan
MRE has gone through tremendous changes since its humble begin-
nings in the late 1980s. The first mine-awareness programs were devel-
oped by Operation Salam, the United Nations’ emergency relief operation 
set up in Pakistan in 1988.2 At the time, the Soviet war in Afghanistan was 
at its peak, lasting until 1989, when the last Soviet troops withdrew from 
Afghanistan and the country became the scene of a vicious civil war.3, 4
During the first years of Operation Salam, it provided MRE mainly 
in refugee camps along the Afghan border with the specific intention 
of preparing returnees for the dangers of ERW. At the end of the war, 
mine-awareness operations began to move into Afghanistan itself.5
The fundamental methodology established under Operation Salam 
still provides the basic framework for MRE. MRE is commonly taught 
by mobile teams, with two teachers and a driver. The teacher team nor-
mally consists of a man and a woman, giving them the ability to conduct 
gender-segregated classes.6, 7, 8
In general, MRE programs consist of lectures with the use of posters, 
silk screens, activity cards, brochures, booklets and pamphlets as educa-
tion materials commonly termed “training aids.” The teacher introduces 
the students to ERW using posters.9, 10 The IED-awareness booklet is in-
tended to supplement existing program materials.
To ensure that the guidelines and teaching systems set by the United 
Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan are followed, UNMACA’s 
quality-assurance teams perform routine checks of the MRE sessions. This 
system is established to provide feedback to the MRE teachers and nongov-
ernmental organizations running MRE programs in particular regions.7
The basic structure of MRE has changed very little over the 
years. The teaching system developed around regular MRE 
constitutes a teaching ideology that transcends Afghan MRE as a 
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Improvised explosive devices have become a significant threat to the people of Afghanistan and have 
surpassed the threat posed by other types of explosive remnants of war. In order to combat these dangers, 
the United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan has worked closely with other groups to develop an 
IED-awareness booklet that supports current mine-risk education efforts. 
whole and reaches community-based training, as well as mine-risk 
education using mass media. The overall MRE messages UNMACA 
developed provide the basis for all MRE within the civilian sector 
of Afghanistan. The NGOs providing the teaching in the field also 
follow the UNMACA guidelines. 
From the 1980s until the mid-1990s, materials were very technical, 
with detailed descriptions of types and models of ordnance and mines, 
and their individual effects. As time went on, it became clear that par-
ticipants were receiving more information than they could absorb dur-
ing the relatively short sessions.10 Since then, a series of messages was 
developed to simplify the MRE training.
Today there are 10 messages that constitute the core of Afghan 
MRE. The last major revision of the messages was made in the win-
ter of 2008, when UNMACA developed materials that introduced 
several victim-assistance issues. The 2005 National Disability Sur-
vey Handicap International developed has been the foundation 
for understanding the importance of developing victim-assistance 
awareness within MRE.10, 11, 12
The new materials have been shaped so that the messages fit the 
Ministry of Education’s MRE plans and national curricula.14, 15, 16 
When the International Security Assistance Forces approached 
UNMACA in 2007 about cooperating on the IED-awareness 
booklet, the framework for cooperation between UNMACA and 
the Ministry of Education was being prepared for the transition. 
This meant that ISAF, UNMACA and the Ministry of Education 
worked as semi-autonomous teams while developing the content 
and design of the IED booklet.17, 18
Children leaving a mine-risk education class held in the village mosque of Qal’eh-ye 
Sefid in the southwestern part of the Kabul province. 
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areas of the country. Field staff have raised concerns 
about using MRE materials that can be interpreted 
as having links with Afghanistan’s government by 
displaying such items as logos and pictures of officials 
(e.g., military or police personnel). The field staff of 
the Afghan NGO Organization of Mine Clearance 
and Afghan Rehabilitation are worried that they 
risk being killed if such materials are found on them 
by insurgents. This concern is also one of the main 
objections expressed by field staff about teaching IED 
awareness, and it has emphasized the need for caution 
in sensitive areas.5
In large parts of Afghanistan, where the 
insurgency has a permanent presence, the number of 
IED incidents is at its highest, which means that the 
areas where IED awareness is most needed are also 
the most inaccessible. The number of IED casualties 
has greatly surpassed those of ERW since 2006. 
This development emphasizes the need for teaching 
IED awareness in the area. The IED-awareness 
booklet represents the first step in countering this 
development and gives the population some tools to deal with the IED threat in their 
everyday lives.
IED-awareness Booklet
Prior to creating the IED-awareness booklet, ISAF was engaged in MRE and IED- 
awareness independently in the field when the military provided training on an ad 
hoc basis. The United Nations and NGOs have criticized some of these MRE and IED-
awareness initiatives for disrupting the civilian MRE system already in place by not fol-
lowing the guidelines UNMACA developed.18, 19
For the development of the IED-awareness booklet, an organizational framework for co-
operation was established. UNMACA was the primary agent in the practical development 
and design of the booklet, working specifically with ISAF to develop a set of IED-awareness 
messages that were compatible and complementary to the current MRE system of messages. 
The Ministry of Education set up a review board that addressed problems in the design and 
implementation of the material regarding Afghan cultural sensibilities and political issues 
that could become problematic in the everyday use of such a booklet.20, 21
It soon became clear that a new frame-
work was needed to sufficiently address prob-
lems concerning IEDs. Consequently, the 
Ministry of Education, UNMACA and ISAF 
developed a three-pronged IED-awareness 
message that included the recognition of 
IEDs and dangerous areas, the detection 
of IEDs, and safe behavior. One of the most 
important tasks was to help children recog-
nize IEDs, so the booklet constructed a sep-
arate message specifically for children.22 The 
booklet also warns of odd and out-of-place 
objects. Out-of-place objects were often 
used as booby traps during the Soviet war 
in Afghanistan and the civil war, and are 
often used by insurgents today.22, 23
In the safe behavior section of the book-
let, the last two messages are fundamental-
ly different and break with the post-conflict 
scenario through which MRE messages are 
commonly developed. The messages reflect 
the dangers of reporting an IED and emphasize that Afghanistan is a conflict zone. The 
need to inform more than one adult reflects the fact that there may be local support for the 
insurgency. “Don’t be afraid to mention something that seems odd” is an attempt to ensure 
that countermeasures against the IED are taken.
Figure 2: This map shows the activity of insurgents in Afghanistan 
as of August 2008.
Skepticism between the civilian and the military sectors 
was evident from the start. Within UNMACA, as well as the 
Ministry of Education, there was concern that a civilian-
military cooperation could blur the line between military 
and humanitarian operations.13, 18
IED Awareness in MRE
ISAF began developing the booklet in the fall of 2007. 
Both the military and civilian sectors saw IED-awareness 
training among the population as an important area that 
was underscored by the increasing number of IED inci-
dents and a growing number of casualties in each incident. 
In August 2008, the International Council for Security 
and Development estimated there was permanent insurgent 
activity in half of the Afghan provinces, and only six 
provinces were characterized by low insurgent activity 
(see map above). The strong insurgent presence has made 
it difficult for the mine-action community to work in many 
Implementation in a Conflict Environment
It is impossible to measure how much 
danger a child puts himself and other 
family members in by reporting an IED, 
but it constitutes a serious dilemma that the 
reporting of an IED might trigger a military 
response. This reality makes it difficult for 
the mine-action organization to be a purely 
neutral humanitarian agent. The direct 
cooperation between ISAF, UNMACA and 
the Ministry of Education, along with the 
transfer of jurisdiction over the MRE field 
to the Ministry of Education, underlines that 
MRE in Afghanistan has indeed become a part 
of the ongoing state-building project (i.e., 
construction of a functioning state). 
The state-building project that began at the 
Bonn conference in 200124 and the following 
support of the sitting government has been a 
process of strong U.N. engagement, but semi-
autonomous agents such as UNMACA have 
been able to function relatively unaffected by 
focusing on the demining and MRE tasks at 
hand. With the transfer of authority over the 
MRE field, UNMACA risks being politicized 
by different actors in the Afghan conflict. 
UNMACA and the affiliated NGOs are caught 
between an institutional post-conflict view 
of the field of mine action and the conflict 
situation they are faced with on the ground.
The map shown on the previous page 
emphasizes just how widespread insurgent 
activity is. The Afghan state is weakened 
furthermore by a lack of control over its 
own territory. Then-U.S. Director of National 
Intelligence Michael McConnell addressed 
these issues in his speech to the U.S. Congress 
on 27 February 2008, when he said, 
“The Taliban was able to control, with 
the population in the area, about 10–
11 percent of the country. The federal 
government, on the other hand, had 
about 30–31 percent, and the rest was 
local control.”25
As mine action has come under 
the jurisdiction of the Afghan state 
through the Ministry of Education, 
the problems of the government’s 
regional control have also impacted 
UNMACA. It challenges the mine-
action community’s ability to 
work both in and outside of state-
controlled territory. The development 
of sustainable MRE that can succeed 
in all areas of Afghanistan is therefore 
seriously challenged by the current 
institutional framework of MRE.
The Challenge Continues
Afghanistan today is at the fore-
front of MRE development, dealing 
with tremendous challenges relating to 
the security of the Afghan people, as well as the 
mine-awareness community itself. There are 
tremendous problems surrounding the intro-
duction of IED awareness in MRE. These are 
challenges that cannot solely be solved in the 
planning stage but need to be addressed when 
performing IED awareness in the field. Thus, 
there is a need for feedback organs that go be-
yond regular quality assurance, ones that are 
able to evaluate not only the immediate effect 
of IED-awareness training but also its wider 
impact on the mine-action community and its 
ability to work effectively.
The statistics clearly show a humanitarian 
need for addressing the IED issue. How to deal 
with the IED problem raises many of the core 
issues humanitarian agents find themselves 
facing when working in conflict zones. The 
mine-action community’s neutrality is chal-
lenged when it develops MRE materials in co-
operation with the state and government. The 
community also needs to negotiate with other 
non-state actors to gain access to areas outside 
state control to protect the citizens there. 26
Including IED awareness in the national 
MRE program in Afghanistan is in many 
ways the responsible choice by the Ministry of 
Education, UNMACA and ISAF to deal with 
the actual problems facing human security in 
Afghanistan; however, it does open a Pandora’s 
box of new challenges that need to be addressed. 
The consequences of the choices made during 
the development of the IED-awareness booklet 
have yet to be seen and examined. The choice 
of including police and military personnel 
in the illustrations could conceivably pose a 
security risk to the field staff and the people 
they are trying to reach, as there is a danger 
of blurring the line between the military and 
humanitarian sector. This challenge, combined 
with the transfer of jurisdiction of MRE to the 
Afghan state, could pose a significant obstacle 
to the ability of MRE campaigns to reach their 
audience, especially outside state-controlled 
territory. A well-functioning institutional 
framework that is able to work in Afghanistan 
as a whole is therefore vital to the success of 
the IED-awareness campaign.
The development of the IED-awareness 
booklet has meant a much-needed transfer 
of knowledge from the military to the civil-
ian sector in dealing with IEDs. This cooper-
ation and the commitment to IED awareness 
need to go beyond the initial work of the IED 
booklet. In order to properly address the IED 
threat, comprehensive research and field test-
ing are needed so risk-education materials can 
address the new challenges that face human 
security in Afghanistan. 
See Endnotes, Page 112
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Figure 3: In 2006, IED casualties (red) surpassed those of explosive remnants of war (blue). This development empha-
sizes the need for a targeted humanitarian effort to reduce the civilian population’s exposure to the IED risk.
Figure 4: IED Awareness Booklet. The use of illustrations of mili-
tary and police was heatedly discussed during the development 
process in relation to the security of MRE personnel and locals.
2
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 19
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol13/iss1/19
